Russia threatens Poland and The United States with nuclear action.

Mr. Lordi wrote:The thing was detonated, how is that fake, people could not fake a nuclear explosion back then, and the fact that the island is gone now has nothing to do with it.

Mr. Lordi wrote:And just because it says Russia is in financial trouble doesnt mena they are in deeper then us?

The Witch King wrote:

Mr. Lordi wrote:first off, Russia Tower, upon completion will be the tallest building until another is completed that is larger.

Nope. Burj Dubai (Link) is supposed to be at least 600 feet taller (and it will be completed this year). Russia Tower is set to be completed in 2012. Not to mention the fact that that the Chicago Spire will be exactly the same height as Russia Tower.

Mr. Lordi wrote:Second of all, you must prove to me that they are in much more financial trouble, which you will fail to do considering they are not in more financial trouble.

That's funny. This tends to say otherwise.

Mr. Lordi wrote:And second of all Tsar Bomba as tested on October 30, 1961 in Novaya Zemlya, an island in the Arctic Sea.

And that disproves that it was a purely propaganda...how?

The fact remains it was too expensive to put into service. The fact that they still opted to build it, and detonate it, confirms that it was a propaganda based measure meant to inspire patriotism/nationalism.

Mr. Lordi wrote:Tsar Bomba was planed to be put in action, and that is why the newer generation of 50 - 100 megaton bombs are now in production, with over 20,000 thought to be stored by the russian government.

There was no previously existing military requirement for a 100 megaton weapon - such weapons are virtually useless for military purposes. The Soviet Union had only one delivery system capable of carrying a weapon of this size - a handful of the relatively slow prop-driven Tu-95 bomber - and it was incapable of intercontinental range with a payload this large. A 100 Mt weapon can level urban areas in a zone 60 km wide, cause heavy damage in a zone 100 km across, cause 3rd degree burns in a region 170 km across (only a bit smaller than the width of West Germany) and eye damage to 220 km. Such a weapon can only be used as a means of destroying an entire urban region - a major urban complex including suburbs and even neighboring cities. This scale of destruction is much larger than any discrete urban area in Western Europe. With its dense settlement, use of such a weapon in Europe is equivalent to an attack on a major portion of an entire nation and its population. Fallout from a low altitude or surface burst in central England could produce lethal exposures extending into the Warsaw Pact nations; a similar explosion in West Germany could create lethal fallout as far as the Soviet border. Even in the United States there were only three urban regions at that time large enough to conceivably merit attack with such a weapon - New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles. On any smaller target it would be simple overkill. Even if the Tu-95 were able to reach Chicago, the closest plausible U.S. target, (which is doubtful given the enormous payload, far in excess of normal for long-range missions, and the added drag from the belly bulge required to house the bomb) it would have been detected crossing the North American early warning line and then been over U.S. and Canadian territory for 8 hours - ample time for jet fighters to intercept and shoot it down

Khrushchev went public regarding the planned superbomb test with the announcement of the new test series issued simultaneously with the first shot fired on 1 September 1961 [Time 1961], [Adamsky and Smirnov 1998]. By pre-announcing the event, Khrushchev exhibited great confidence in his weapon development team, and also placed extreme pressure on them. In any ordinary test of a new weapon design a failure results in only a delay in successful completion (and the cost of the materials expended). Now any marked deviation in yield would result in the loss of the planned propaganda value in which Khrushchev placed so much emphasis. The make-or-break character of this test was heightened still further by its scheduling to coincide with the final sessions of the Twenty-Second Party Congress.

Given the overtly political nature of the development and test of this device, the dubious military usefulness of a weapon of this size, and the extremely compressed development effort, it is not a foregone conclusion that this device would ever be manufactured in quantity or accepted into the stockpile of the Soviet Union.